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COMMENT
THE CATAWBAS' FINAL BATTLE: A BITTERSWEET
VICTORY
Lynn Loftis*

The End
Dateline: Washington D.C., October 27, 1993 - President Bill Clinton
signed into law a bill ending a battle between the Catawba Indians and the
State of South Carolina that began with the advent of European settlers into
the Catawbas' native land over four hundred years ago.' At the heart of the
dispute was a 144,000-acre tract of land located in York and Lancaster
counties of South Carolina The settlement provides that the-Catawba Tribe
will relinquish all claims to their aboriginal lands3 with an estimated value of
over $2 billion,4 in return for a $50 million cash settlement
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 103116, 107 Stat. 1118 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 941 (Supp. V 1993)); see Mike Smith &
Chris Burnit, Region in Brief,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 28, 1993, at Al.

Rep. John Spratt (D-S.C.) was one of the leading negotiators in the settlement. Representative
Spratt's ancestor, Kanawha Spratt, was the first white man to lease part of the reservation from
the Catawbas. Lyn Riddle, South CarolinaSettling Catawba Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992,

§ 8, at 1. Representative Spratt currently owns 810 acres of land within the area of former
dispute. 138 CONG. REC. H6657-01 (daily ed. July. 27, 1992) (statement of Rep. Spratt). At least
one report has credited Representative Spratt with causing the administration to change its former
position against the Catawba settlement. Only hours before a cliffhanger vote on President
Clinton's budget, the administration reversed its position in support of the settlement. Spratt then
voted for Clinton's budget, which passed in the House 218-216. Robert Rankin & Brigid Schulte,
Deals Kept House Dems in Line, ARiz. REPUBLiC, Aug. 7, 1993, at 1.
2. CATAWBA CLAIM AREA MARKEr EVALUATION 2 (1978) [hereinafter CATAWBA CLAIM],
reprinted in Settlement of the Catawba Indian Land Claims: Hearing on H.R. 3274 Before the
House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 329, 331 (1979) [hereinafter

Hearing on H.R. 3274]; see also Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.2
(4th Cir. 1983) (Catawba 1), affd, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba II), rev'd and
remanded, 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (Catawba III).

3. "Aboriginal lands" includes the land granted to the Catawbas through treaty in 1760 and
1763 which became the source of later dispute between the Catawbas and the state of South
Carolina. The disputed land lied within the Catawba's aboriginal territory. Catawba Indians v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 498, 522 (1986) (Catawba II1)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. Don B. Miller, Catawba Tribe v. South Carolina:A History of Perseverance, NARF

LEGAL REV. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder Colo.), Winter/Spring 1993, at 3, 10 (vol.
18. no. 1) [hereinafter Miller]. In 1979, the land in controversy had a value of approximately $1.2
billion. CATAWBA CLAIM, supra note 2, at 4, reprintedin Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2,

at 333.
5. Catawba Tribe Approves Settlement with South Carolina, NARF LEGAL REV. (Native
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The search into the Catawba Nation seemed to promise the uncovering of
a grave injustice - that of Indian people being forced to relinquish their
sovereignty for cash. Analysis failed to produce the expected quick and brutal
blow. Instead, a slow and steady attack on the Catawbas was revealed which
was perhaps more cruel.
While the settlement is one of the largest of its kind in U.S. history,6 an
examination of the battle between the Tribe and South Carolina reveals a
bittersweet victory not only for the Catawbas but for all Indian people, for the
struggle has again revealed how Indians are denied what is theirs by a
government which acts like a childhood bully. The bully holds out the desired
object he knows the other child wants; yet in the end the bully cruelly
deprives. For years, the United States and the South Carolina governments
have promised the Catawba people land and assistance, but in the end have
never delivered. Seemingly, the kinder course of action would have been to
tell the Catawbas they could not "play" from the start, so their pain could
begin and end. Instead, the government has teased the Tribe into a game of
deprivation for over two hundred years. Clearly, the government never had
any intention of losing.
Examination will show that the settlement will benefit the Catawba people.
However, that same examination more pronouncedly reveals the frustration
and injustice the Catawbas faced at every stage of the protracted battle. To
understand the Catawbas' plight it is necessary to return to the beginning, to
a time when the Catawbas looked at the white men who visited their lands as
nothing more than visitors.
The Beginning
The year 1540 brought the first known advent of European travelers into
the land which was later to be known as Catawba Country.7 Over the next
century-and-a-half the Indians inhabiting the land peacefully coexisted with
European settlers and slipped easily into the Atlantic trade system.' These
Indians inhabited land next to the Catawba River and were referred to by
different names, such as the Succa, Suttirie, Charra, and NassawY Shortly

American Rights Fund, Boulder Colo.), Winter/Spring 1993, at I (vol, 18. no. 1) [hereinafter
Settlement].
6. Congress Settles Indian Land Claim - 153 Years After Breaking Treaty with the Tribe
According to Catawba,PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current
File.
7. DOUGLAS BROWN, THE CATAWBA INDIANS 39-40 (1966); POLLY DAMMANN Er AL., A
HISTOP.Y OF THE CATAWBA TRIBE AND ITS RESERVATION LANDS 1540-1959, at 6 (1978),

reprintedin Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 135, 141; JAMES H. MERRELL, THE INDIANS'
NEW WORLD: CATAWBAS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS FROM EUROPEAN CONTACT THROUGH THE ERA

OF REMOvAL 8 (1989).
8. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 36-37.
9. Id. at 92. Tribes classified as part of the Catawba Nation include: the Catawba Proper
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after the turn of the eighteenth century, Europeans began referring to the
various Indian tribes as "Catawbas."'0
The Catawbas faced Indian enemies from both the north and the south.
The Westos and Iroquis tribes attacked frequently." The Catawbas also faced
the traumas of disease." However, the Catawbas had little difficulty with the
Europeans because the chain of trade created a bond of peace. 3 Although
outwardly peaceful towards the Catawbas, the Europeans were waging a silent
war by encroaching on the Indians' land and making the Indians dependent on
Anglo trade. The Catawbas could not as easily defend themselves from this
subtle attack.
The bands of Indians which were called the "Catawbas" did not have a
defined system of communication or self-regulation. 4 Around 1720, as a
response to the colonies' desire to deal with a unified group along with
continued hostile Indian attacks, these tribal bands were forced to unite into
one nation with a defined system of rules and responsibilities. 5 Though
unified, the Catawbas differed from the traditional European notion of Indians.
The Catawbas did not adorn themselves with long headdresses and often lived
in log cabins.'"
In the 1720s, the Catawbas had more Indian enemies than they could
handle. 17 Disease, the nation's "greatest Enemie," lowered the Catawbas'
ability to defend against the Indian warriors and colonists." To solve their
9
problems, the Catawbas set out to make friends with the Anglo-Americans.
The Catawbas entered into social agreements and trading agreements with the
m
whites, which only heightened the Catawbas' dependence on Europeans. '
The markings of white society within the Catawba community, such as scarlet

(Katahba, Issa, Iswa, Ushery, Yse, Usi, Esau, Essawee, Esaugh, Esaw), the Chewah, the Waterees,
the Eeno, the Congaree, the Natchez, some Yamasee, the Coosahs, the Sugarees, the Waxhaws,

the Santees, the Pedees, the Watteree-Chickanees, the Shakori, the Sissipahaws, the Keyauwees,
the Sewees, the Waccamaws, the Woccons, the Etiwaws, the Tutelos, and the Saponis. DAMMANN
ET AL., supra note 7, at 2 n.2, reprintedin Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 137; see also
BROWN, supra note 7, at 3-4.
10. MERRELL, supranote 7, at 92-94; CHARLES HUDSON, THE CATAWBA NAnON 5 (1970).
11. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 41; see also BROWN, supra note 7, at 168.
12. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 43.

13. See id. at 32-40.
at 112-13.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 113-14.
16. Jim Hoagland, South Carolina Catawbas Seek Tribal Identity; Western Traditions
Borrowed in Drive ForLand and Money, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1978, at D3.
17. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 135.
18. Id. at 136.
19. See id. at 143.
20. See id. at 150-56.
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coats, made it obvious that the "native leaders no longer fully controlled their
own or their society's destiny."'"
In 1729, South Carolina's governor launched a township scheme around the
frontier settlement of Pine Tree Hill. The streams of settlers "flowed swiftly
toward the very heart of the Nation."' By 1755, the Catawbas no longer had
to go to the colonial settlements; the settlements had come to them. The
Nation was completely surrounded." The close proximity caused problems.
Theft, trespass, livestock control, and land use differences combined to create
tension between the Catawbas and their Anglo neighbors.' Compounding the
Catawbas' problem of adjustment, encroaching settlers brought black slaves
that showed the Catawbas the racial realities of colonial American life.25
Still, in 1759, twenty percent of the Catawba nation went north with His
Majesty's forces to fight the French.0 "Despite the signs of friendship, the
shadow of conflict remained." 7 Smallpox further depleted the Indian tribe,
kilting approximately a thousand Catawbas, reducing the tribe's size to a mere
five hundred.' "The epidemic, important as it was in signaling a new
direction in Catawba history, was no more than the first step on a long, hard
road, the Nation's own trail of tears."''
The Catawba Trail of Tears
During July 1760, what was left of the Catawba tribe met with the Crown
Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Pine Tree Hill and struck a deal. The Pine
Tree Hill Treaty provided that the Catawbas would relinquish their claims to
a circular tract of land sixty miles across where the Indians currently lived,
in return for clear title to fifteen square miles of land and a promise that a fort
would be built in the Nation.0 It is this fifteen-mile tract of land which later
became the source of dispute between the Catawbas and South Carolina.
When asked why the Catawbas would bargain to be removed to land when so
many other tribes had fought against removal, the chief of the Catawbas
replied that planters pushing onto the Nation's territory "will not be stopped
for they say they will continue to do so unless we show them a paper to
-..

restrain them."'"

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ld.
at 156.
Id. at 171.
See id.at 171.
See id. at 182-87.
id. at 181.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 193-95.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 198; see also Miller, supra note 4, at 4.
MERRELL, supra note 7,at 200.
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The Crown then, in the Proclamation of 1763, prohibited the issuance of
survey warrants or patents on any lands reserved to Indians or the purchase
of such lands. Still, white settlers continued to move west. 2 The Catawbas
became increasingly dissatisfied with the Crown's failure to uphold the 1763
Proclamation and the 1760 Pine Hill Treaty. The King determined that in
order to secure the southwestern frontier, a treaty was needed between the
Crown and the five major tribes in the southeast33 to assure the Indians'
allegiance to the Crown.' A new treaty was negotiated which seemingly
accomplished both the King and the Catawbas' goals. In 1763, the Treaty of
Augusta was signed, in which the Catawbas reaffirmed their assent to the
fifteen-mile reservation in return for the Crown's renewed promise to uphold
the 1760 Treaty.35 In other words, the 1763 Treaty reinstated and ratified the
1760 Treaty.
After the signing of the Treaty of Augusta, the fort promised to the
Catawbas in 1760 was finally built; yet it stood as a cruel joke on the Nation.
No promises had ever been made that the fort would be manned or
maintained. Neither trappers or troops ever moved in and when the Catawbas
requested that something be done, the colony invited the Indians to build
houses themselves. By the end of the century, the fort had fallen into
disrepair.' Again, the bully taunted the child, "You can have your toy but
we won't play with you."
Even though the Indians had clear title to their land, the settlers continued
to attack that title in subtle ways. Whites began acquiring long term leases on
the Catawbas' new property in direct violation of the Proclamation of 1763,
the Treaty of Augusta, and South Carolina's colonial law of 1739."7
Eventually, the settlers subleased the property to the point where the Catawbas
could not successfully collect rent. s" Subleasing, coupled with fraudulent

32. Mark Ulmer, Tribal Property: Defining the Parametersof the Federal Trust Relationship
Under the Non-IntercourseAct: Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV.

101, 116 (1985).
33. The Treaty of Augusta was negotiated with the Creeks, the Choctaws, the Cherokees,
the Chickasaws, and the Catawbas. Miller, supranote 4, at 4; Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note
2, at 101 (statement of Gilbert Blue, Chief, Catawba Tribe of Indians of South Carolina).
34. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 101 (statement of Chief Blue); see also Ulmer,
supra note 32, at 116 n.68.
35. Miller, supra note 4, at 4; Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 101 (statement of
Chief Blue).
36. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 198.

37. Ulmer, supranote 32, at 116. South Carolina enacted a statute in 1808 which invalidated
leases on Indian lands unless the lease was for less than 99 years and witnessed by the
Commissioner. Id. at 116-17 n.73.
38. By the 1830s, nearly all the reservation land had been leased to non-Indians in violation
of state and federal law. Id. at 116.
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practices on the part of colonial agents appointed to collect the Indians' rents,
effectively terminated the Catawba's ability to profit from leaseholds."
Still, the Catawbas continued to extend their loyalty to their white
neighbors. The tribe joined the American colonists in war, this time against
the Crown. As a reward for their patriotism, the new American republic took
title to the Catawbas' land from the Crown and ceded it back to the tribe, thus
ratifying the 1760 and 1763 treaties.' However, the Catawbas' plight did not
improve. Settlers continued to encroach on Catawba land."' Frustrated, the
Catawbas made a plea to the South Carolina legislature: "I fought against the
British for your sake, the British have disappeared, and you are free, yet from
me the British took nothing nor have I gained any thing by their defeat."42
The legislature did nothing.
The U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1788 and shortly thereafter the First
Congress enacted the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790."' The NonIntercourse Act provided that no state or individual could acquire any interest
in Indian lands without the consent and participation of the federal
government." Subsequently, South Carolina enacted a law which allowed the
leasing of Catawba land in direct violation of the Non-Intercourse Act.45 The
federal government had never granted its consent for the leasing." Of course,
the encroachment continued.
As the century ended, the Catawbas' proud demeanor was showing signs
of wear.
Once proprietors of the... [region], they now existed only on the
sufferance of people inclined to cheat them as often as protect
them, mock them as readily as befriend them. It was a sad state,
requiring more quiet resignation than open resistance, smiles in
place of frowns, submission to the humiliations dished out....
Yet compared with the scores of other Indian peoples that entered

39. See MERRELL, supra note 7, at 223-24.
.40. d.at 223.

41. Miller, supra note 4, at 4.
42. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 218.
43. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988)).
44. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 138 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988)). The Act states in relevant
part:
"No purchase, grant, lease, or conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be
made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id.; see also Cat iwba
Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.7. (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba 1).
Transactions in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act are void. See FELIX S. COHFN'S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 152-80 (Rennard L. Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter CoHEN],

45. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 102-03 (statement of Chief Blue).
46. Id. at 28, reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 3274, supranote 2, at 102-03; see also Catawba
Indians v. South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1446 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 906 (1989)
(Catawba IV).
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the eighteenth century with Catawbas but did not live to see the
nineteenth, the Nation's fate does not seem so bad.47
The beginning of the nineteenth century revealed the Catawbas' plight as
one of poverty and oppression. By 1826, only 30 families were said to be
living on the reservation,48 yet still the Catawbas endured. The Nation
maintained a close family structure and a culture in which women played a
dominant role.49 Interestingly, all members of the tribe wore a silver nose
ring, often with a tiny silver heart dangling from it.'
The strength of the Catawba spirit is reflected in the story of John Nettles.
Missionaries, no matter how hard they tried, could not divorce the Catawba
people from their culture. Many projects were undertaken to "Christianize"
the Indians.' The College of William and Mary's program was the most
famous." The administration of William and Mary brought young Indians
to the college to instruct them in the art of being an Englishman, so they
could then return and educate their tribe. The Catawbas sent a young John
Nettles, who graduated from the three-year course with high honors."
Shortly before Nettles was to return home, he went to a tavern and was
later found passed out drunk in the street. The college was mortified that the
hope of the Catawba Nation would jeopardize his future. Soon, Nettles did
return home but did not live up to the college's expectations.'M John quickly
reassimilated into Catawba ways. The missionaries project had failed. Still,
John's education benefitted the tribe because John was able to serve as a
liaison between the tribe and the Americans!' When John grew old, the
Catawbas requested they be allowed to send more youths to be taught to read
and write, but wanted no part of the missionaries' "Christianizing. ' No
matter how intertwined the Catawbas' lives became with the whites, the
Catawba spirit and culture remained.
In 1840, the Catawbas again had to bow to whites who had encroached on
their lands. Settlers who had leased land from the Catawbas since the 1760
Treaty went to the South Carolina legislature and mounted an attack to have
title passed to them. South Carolina's governor observed that "the conduct of
our State, towards the Indians, has, from the beginning been a pleasing feature
in her history," while at the same time noting that the lands in question were

47. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 225.
48. DAMMANN ET AL., supranote 7, at 45-46, reprintedin Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note

2, at 180-81.
49. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 235-37.
50. Id. at 229.

51. Id. at 240.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
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"among the most fertile in the State" and that "the State is deriving no
revenue from a productive section of her territory."" As author James
Merrell stated, the governor's goal was clear: "treat the Indians fairly, but get
them out.""9
When the situation looked hopeless, the Catawbas said they would
negotiate; the result was the 1840 Treaty of Nation Ford." The treaty

provided that the Catawbas would give up all their lands in return for South
Carolina's promise to buy $5000 worth of land to the Catawbas' liking (and
if less than $5000 was spent on the new land, the Catawbas would receive the
difference). Additionally, the agreement provided for $2500 to be given to the

Calawbas when they left their current land and, additionally, $1500 a year for
the next nine years.

South Carolina failed to abide by the terms of the agreement and the
Calawbas wandered homeless for two years before a new reservation was

finally located." In 1842, 630 acres were selected approximately eight miles
east of Rock Hill, South Carolina.'

The Catawbas were pleased with the

choice because the selected tract was within the boundaries of their first
reservation given away in the 1760 Treaty.' The Catawbas continue to
reside on the 630-acre tract today.

57. Id. at 247.
58. Id.
59. An Indian agent explained, in a report to the Governor of South Carolina:
They were then strong and felt themselves in their own greatness, governed by
their own laws, working the best spots of their lands and leasing out the poorer
portions to the white men. This state of things went on til the whites got King's
Bottom, the last spot of the reservation. The poor Indians then felt their distress
beginning, and run from house to house for the rents of their lands, which they
had leased out to the white people, which was generally paid in old horses, old
cows, or bed quilts and clothes, at prices that the whites set on the articles taken.
This brought on a state of starvation and distress.
Under this state of things, they wandered from place to place, begging, til
1839, when they proposed a treaty with the State, and relinquished all their rights
and interest of this domain to the State of South Carolina. There were many
efforts made previous to this by former Governors, to effect a treaty with the
Catawba Indians, but always failed. They were then driven to it by being
surrounded by white men, cheating them out of their rights, and partaking of the
vices of the whites and but few of their virtues, which is a distress to me.
B.S. Massey, Indian Agent, Report to the Governor of South Carolina on the Catawba Indians
(Dec. 12, 1853), in Miller, supra note 4, at 5.
60. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 249.
61. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 103-04 (statement of Chief Blue); see also
Ulmer, supra note 32, at 117.
62. Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 28-29 (statement of Chief Blue). The 630-acre
tract represents less than one-half of one percent of the Catawbas' aboriginal lands which were
taken from them in the 1760 Treaty of Pine Hill. Id.
53. it.
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The 1840 Treaty of Nation Ford plunged the Catawbas into deeper
poverty.' Rents were no longer collected and South Carolina failed to pay
the Catawbas the money it had. promised. The legislature decided any
difference between the purchase price of the new reservation and the $5000
which was earmarked for land acquisition should not be returned to the
Catawbas. Additionally, the $2500 which South Carolina promised to pay the
Catawbas when they left their lands was never paid, and also for the first two
years after the agreement, the Catawbas never received the promised $1

500 annual payment. Subsequently, the Catawbas received limited annual
payments usually in the form of goods.0
Compared with other Indian tribes, the Catawbas seemed fortunate. 0 Still,
the Nation "had signed away the last acre of land they could call home. With

64. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 254.
65. See DAMMANN ET AL., supranote 7, at 48-50, reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra
note 7, at 183-86. In future litigation, the Catawbas claim that the 1840 Treaty was invalid
because: (1)the federal government never consented and therefore the 1840 Treaty violated the
Non-Intercourse Act of 1790; and (2) South Carolina failed to abide by the terms of the Treaty.
As part of the second argument, it is noted that not only did South Carolina fail to pay the
Catawbas the $2500 payment upon moving off their lands and a substantial portion of the nine
$1500 annual payments, but also that South Carolina failed to spend the required $5000 on land,
or in the alternative, transfer the difference between $5000 and the purchase price to the tribe.
In a letter from Indian agent White to South Carolina's governor, White states that "[t]his land
cost $2,000 for which a conveyance was made to myself as their agent and filed in the executive
office." South Carolina claimed it utilized most of the $5000.
The State contends that based on these purchases, the terms of the Treaty of
Nation Ford were substantially honored. The State's position appears to be wholly
unsupportable for several reasons. First, the December 18, 1840 Act of the South
Carolina legislature which ratified the Treaty of Nation Ford expressly provided
that the money authorized therein could only be used to purchase new reservation
lands as described in the agreement. Second, in order to sustain the State's view,
it is necessary to conclude either that the Catawba Indians conveyed their lands
in 1840 for an unconscionably low price or that the State, two years later, acquired
650 acres of the former reservation of 144,000 acres for an exorbitantly high
amount. Third, the Governor of South Carolina reported in 1843 to the South
Carolina legislature that the treaty had not been carried out and that an informal
'experiment' had been developed which would allow the Catawba Indians to reside
on a farm or their old reservation.
Id. at 49-50, reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 184-85.
66. MERRELL, supra note 7, at 254-55.
67. As James Merrell stated:
This was, after all, the Age of Indian Removal, and for most peoples removal did
not mean wandering off to a Cherokee town or some other "thinly populated" area
they fancied; it meant being uprooted at bayonet point and prodded a thousand
miles west. No doubt more than one Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, or Seminole
would gladly have traded places.
Id. at 249-50.
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so precious that
it went something impossible to define yet infinitely precious,
'
Catawbas have been trying ever since to get it back."
The State wanted the Catawbas gone but could not seem to bring
themselves to sell the reservation and exile the Tribe. The Catawbas had been
loyal to the State consistently over the years.' Perhaps the reason the
Catawbas were allowed to remain was because the state expected that the tribe
would die out on its own.7"
However, the Catawbas quietly survived the next century. The manufacture
of clay pottery became increasingly important to the nation's economy." The
men of the tribe continued to hunt and often sought jobs as paid laborers.'
As always, the Catawba ways remained, even though oppression abounded.
The year 1880 began a hundred-year period during which the Catawbas
went to the federal and state legislatures time after time in an attempt to
regain the land that had been taken from them. The tribe asserted that the
1840 Treaty of Nation Ford was void because it violated the Indian NonIntercourse Act.' The federal government never participated in or approved
of the 1840 Treaty as the Non-Intercourse Act required.74 In the alternative,
the Catawbas claimed possession of the fifteen-mile tract of land because
South Carolina failed to uphold the terms of the 1840 Treaty." Under either
theory of recovery the result was the same - the 1840 Treaty was void and
therefore the 1760 Treaty (ratified by the 1763 Treaty and adopted by the
U.S.) was still in effect. Accordingly, the Catawbas were either entitled to
rentais from the fifteen-mile tract of land they received through the 1760
Treaty or the possession of that land.
The Catawbas submitted their claim to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
in 1905. The BIA told the Catawbas that they were not entitled to federal
protection and must seek redress through the State of South Carolina,76 the
very party that the Catawbas' claim was against. In other words, the Catawbas
were told that their opponent would now sit as judge in deciding their fate.
Of course, South Carolina's Attorney General determined that the 1840 Treaty
was valid and that South Carolina had fulfilled its requirements under the
agreement." In 1910, a commission was appointed by the South Carolina

68. Id. at 250.
69. See id. at 256.
70. Id. at 257. Additional factors were the Catawbas' reluctance to leave and the
government's inability to find a host reservation. Id.
71. Id. at 267-77.
72. Id. at 267.
73. Miller. supraz note 4, at 5. For a discussion of the Non-Intercourse Act, see supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76. Miller, supra note 4, at 5
77. Id.
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legislature to investigate the Catawba situation. The commission
recommended that the State purchase additional land for the Catawbas. The
legislature took no action.7 In 1921, another commission was appointed
which also recommended that additional land be purchased and again, the
legislature failed to act 9 In 1924, private businessmen of Rock Hill took it
upon themselves to conduct a study and make recommendations to the
legislature which echoed those recommendations that came before. Again, no
action was taken.'
The Catawbas' chief appeared before the legislature on three different
occasions over the next five years, asking that his people be given farms,
homes, and citizenship."' The legislature did nothing. It was apparent the
Catawbas would get no relief from South Carolina, so the tribe refocused its
efforts on the federal government.
In 1930, the federal government recognized the Catawbas' plight as one of
abject poverty, yet it took seven years for Congress to introduce legislation
which would establish a Catawba rehabilitation program in cooperation with
South Carolina.' Unfortunately, the legislation was never voted on because
of the Interior Department's reluctance to "adopt any more Indians."' Three
years later, a similar bill was defeated."
After facing even more government rejection, the Secretary of the Interior
finally approved a Memorandum of Understanding in 1943 between the Tribe,
the State, and the U.S. Department of the Interior. The memorandum provided
that South Carolina would acquire approximately $75,000 worth of land close
to the existing 630-acre tract and would convey title to that land to the
Secretary of the Interior.' The most important aspect of the agreement to
understand for future developments is that this memorandum did not in any
way affect the Catawbas' original 630-acre tract or the Catawbas' land claim
based on the 1840 Treaty.
During the negotiations for the Memorandum of Understanding, South
Carolina had initially attempted to make as a condition to the agreement the
Catawbas' surrender of all possible land claims against the state based on the
1840 Treaty.' The Department of the Interior and the Catawbas both refused
to condition the Memorandum of Understanding on the release of the claim.
A letter from the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs made this clear." As Chief Blue explained,
78. Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
d. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ulmer, supra note 32, at 118.
Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2,at 106-07 (statement of Chief Blue).
The letter stated:
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"It is thus apparent that none of the parties to the 1943 Memorandum of

Understanding intended the establishment of the federal relationship to in any
way affect the Catawba Tribe's existing claim arising out of the 1840
treeity."' Indeed, it is clear the Catawbas would not have entered into the

Memorandum of Understanding without such agreement. 9
The 1943 Memorandum provided that in return for South Carolina's
promise to purchase land, the federal government would provide limited

services to the Tribe in the areas of health, education, and economic
development opportunities.' ° Pursuant to the agreement, South Carolina

purchased 3434 acres of land at a cost of $70,000 and conveyed the title in
trust to the Secretary of the Interior.9 However, the state did not convey title

It is further noted that the requirement included in the original draft (of the
memorandum of understanding) submitted on October 9 to the effect that the
Catawba Indians promised 'to execute, in favor of the State of South Carolina, a
release and quitclaim of all claims... against the State. . .'has been eliminated
from the present draft. This elimination is most desirable in that it avoids a
procedure of doubtful legality which would have consisted in using a contract
under the Johnson-OMalley Act in order to deprive the Indian tribe of claims
which it might be able to enforce in the courts.
DAMlqANN Er AL., supranote 7, at 57 (citing BIA File No. 12,492), reprintedin Hearing on H.R.
3274, supra note 7, at 192 (emphasis added).
88. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Chief Blue).
89. See Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Catawba 1),
affd, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba11),
rev'd and remanded, 476 U.S. 498
(1986) (Catawba 11).
90. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 118. The federal government did not want to enter into a
guardian-wardship relationship with the Catawbas. A report of the Secretary of the Interior, dated
August 27, 1959, stated:
Efforts were made to bring the Catawba Indians under Federal jurisdiction during
the 1930's when their plight was especially aggravated by the general depression.
These efforts culminated in a memorandum of understanding approved on
December 14, 1943, in which the Indians, the State, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs each agreed to take certain actions to alleviate the Catawbas' depressed
economic condition. The agreement did not specify that the federal government
was assuming guardianship of these Indians and neither the Indians nor the State
ever claimed that the Catawbas were wards of the federal government.
DAMNIANN Er AL., supra note 7, at 55-56, reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at
190-91 (Exhibit I).
On October 31, 1940, a memorandum from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the
Secretary of the Interior, regarding the Catawba Indians closed as follows:
We should also offer limited advisory help in order to improve the standard of
State care of these Indians. There is no question of assuming Federal guardianship
jurisdiction but merely of carrying out the apparent desire of Congress to give a
small degree of aid to the State, coupled with expert advice.
Id.
91. Miller, supra note 4, at 7.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/7

No. 1]

COMMENT

to the 630-acre reservation. South Carolina still retains title to the 630-acre

plot to this dayY
"The hope created by the purchase of the new lands and eligibility for

federal services soon turned to frustration as federal Indian policy took an
abrupt about-face."93 In the early 1950s, Congress decided that the
government should terminate the trust relationships between Indian tribes and
the United States as soon as possible.' Twelve termination statutes were
enacted within roughly a fifteen-year period. 5 These statutes provided for
federal restrictions on tribal lands to be removed. The tribal lands were either
distributed to individual members or sold and the proceeds allocated to tribal

members.
Congressional

termination policies

coincided

with the Catawbas'

dissatisfaction over minimal federal government support!7 and the tribal
members' inability to secure financing for farm operations and home

improvements because their newly acquired lands were subject to federal
restrictions on alienation.9 The Catawbas had to have one or the other to

survive - government aid or the ability to utilize their reservation for credit.
Since it was apparent neither would be forthcoming under the current policies

of the government, the Catawbas agreed that termination legislation should be
enacted so they could freely alienate their lands. 9

Again, an analysis of legislative reports show that the sole purpose of the
termination act would be to undo only that relationship which the 1943
Memorandum of Understanding had created."° The 1943 memorandum only

92. See Catawba 1,718 F.2d at 1293 n.4.
93. Miller, supra note 4, at 7.
94. Id. "Termination em" refers to the federal policy from 1953 to the mid-1960s of ending
the federal government's supervisory responsibilities for Indian tribes. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at
1293 n.5; see CoHEN, supra note 44, at 152-80.
95. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 125 n.1 17 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-565g (1988); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 677-677aa (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 691-708 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 721-728 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§
741-760 (1988); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 843, 70 Stat. 893, repealed by Act of May 15, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-281, § l(b)(l), 92 Stat. 246; Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 881, 70 Stat. 937, repealed
by Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, §l(b)(2), 92 Stat. 246; Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch.
909, 70 Stat. 963, repealedby Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, §l(b)(3), 92 Stat. 246;
Act of June 17, 1754, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, repealed by Act of Dec. 22, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93197, §3(b), 87 Stat. 770; 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 971-980 (1988); 72 Stat.
619); see also South Carolina v. Catawba Indians, 476 U.S. 498, 504 n.lI (1986) (Catawba II1).
96. Miller, supranote 4, at 8.
97. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supranote 2. at 107-09 (statement of Chief Blue).
98. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 119.
99. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 108 (statement of Chief Blue); see also
HUDSON, supra note 10, at 100.
100. DAmMANN ET AL supra note 7, at 59-60, reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra
note 2, at 194-95. The January 3, 1959, resolution of the Catawba General Council requested
Congressman Hemphill to introduce legislation which would remove federal restrictions, but
specifically stated that nothing in the Act should affect the status of any tribal claim against the
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covered the new 3434 acres of land purchased for the Catawbas and the
federal government's provision of limited services."0 ' The Catawba Tribe

only consented to agree to termination after being assured by the BIA that its
longstanding claim against South Carolina would remain unaffected."
Therefore, after the termination act, the Catawbas still "owned" their 630-acre
tract, just as they still possessed their land claim arising out of the 1840
Treaty.

On September 21, 1959, the Catawba Division of Assets Act" became

law.,"

However, the termination act did not go into effect until 1962."0

State of South Carolina. Id., reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 194-95.
Congressman Hemphill had requested that the Department of the Interior draft the 1959 act in
a manner which would "accomplish the desires set forth within the resolution." At the hearings
before this Committee on July 27, 1959, the Associate Commissioner of Indian Affairs testified
that the Department of the Interior had "drafted a bill along the lines that we thought the Indians
had been discussing." Id., reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 194-95.
The House and Senate reports on the bill indicate that its sole purpose was to simply undo
that which had been done sixteen years earlier by the Memorandum of Understanding. Id. at 62,
reprintedin Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 197. The legislative history of the 1959 Act
shows that Congress sought only to remove federal restrictions from and distribute the 3400 acre
reservation acquired in 1943. Id., reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 197.
Congressman Hemphill's exact words were:
Now therefore, BE IT RESOLVED that, in view of the benefits that will accrue
to all the members of the tribe by the equitable distribution of the tribal assets.
. . to accomplish the removal of Federal restrictions against the alienation of
Catawba land ... and do all those things necessary to accomplish the purposes of
this legislation at no cost to the Catawba Indians or claim against their assets, and
that nothing in this legislationshall affect the status of any claim against the State
of South Carolinaby the Catawba Tribe.
Id. at 59, reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 194 (emphasis added).
I01. See Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291. 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Catawba i), affd, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba Ii). rev'd and remanded, 476 U.S. 498
(1986) (Catawba III).
102. Miller, supra note 4, at 8. The BIA drafted a resolution for the Tribe consenting to
division of the federal assets and, consistent with its assurances, included provision conditioning
tribal consent on leaving the treaty claim unaffected.
After securing the Tribe's resolution, the BIA and Congressman Hemphill
assumed the role of speaking for the Tribe in the legislative process and
throughout the entire legislative process, there was not another mention of the land
claim, While the Congressmen and the BIA purported throughout the process to
be acting only in accord with tribal wishes, the legislation they drafted did not
expressly preserve the claim. However, the BIA, which drafted the bill, repeatedly
told the Tribe and emphasized to Congress that it had been drafted to conform to
tribal desires as expressed in the resolution. No tribal officials appeared at the
hearings on the bill nor did the Tribe submit written'testimony.
Id.
103. 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1988).
104. Miller, supranote 4, at 8. The Act provided for the preparation of a tribal membership
roll, the tribal council's designation of sites for church, park, playground, and cemetery purposes,
and the division of remaining assets among the enrolled members of the tribe. Catawba 1, 718
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The Division of Assets Act provided that the tribal membership roll would be
closed and tribal property distributed among the tribal members."° The 3434
acre tract of land was sold and each Catawba family received approximately
$1500." "However, all did not go well. The federal termination program
did not take the spiritual aspects of tribalism into account, and no thought was
given to the effects of tribalism on the individual."'" The Indian spirit could

F.2d at 1294.
Section 935 of the Division of Assets Act provided that:
The constitution of the tribe adopted pursuant to... this title shall be revoked by
the Secretary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of
the special services performed by the United States for Indians because of their
status as Indians, all statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of
their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several
States shall apply to them in the same manner they apply to other persons or
citizens within their jurisdiction. Nothing in this subchapter, however, shall affect
the status of such persons as citizens of the United States.
25 U.S.C. § 935.
Section 936 of the Division of Assets Act provided that "(n]othing in this subchapter shall
affect the rights, privileges, or obligations of the tribe and its members under the laws of South
Carolina." Id. § 936.
105. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1294.
106. The Division of Assets Act provided
for closing the membership roll, and for distributing all tribal property among the
members in approximately equal shares. Members who have assignments of land
from the tribe, or members of their families, are given the right to select the
assignments as parts of their distributive shares. The remainder of the tribal
property will be sold and the proceeds of the sale will be distributed. Any
property that is not sold within 2 years will be conveyed to a trustee for
liquidation and distribution. When the program is completed, the Catawba Indians
will cease to be subject to the Federal indian laws, but their status and rights under
South Carolina law will not be affected.
DAMMANN Er AL., supra note 7, at 61, reprintedin Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 196
(Exhibit I).
107. Id. at 60, reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 195.
108. Hearing on H.R. 3274, supra note 2. at 465 (statement of Thomas J. Blumer, titled:
Two Points Concerning a Just Settlement of the Catawba Indian Land Suit of 1977 (n.d.)).
Blumer argues that the government should not be allowed to terminate the Catawbas' tribal unit,
citing several examples of Catawbas who spent their allotment money on clothing, moving
expenses, speculation and drink. Id.at 465-68.
A cash settlement for the Catawba Nation is not a fair solution to the tribe's future
needs. Tribalism is still a strong force among the Catawbas.... In the future, as
individual Catawba Indians have difficulties and need a home, they will naturally
gravitate toward their reservation and their tribal government. Others will never
leave the Catawba Tribe but will spend their entire lives in the community of their
birth. Through the settlement of the Treaty of 1840, the Catawbas should be left
prepared to assist tribal members, even those who do not have the foresight to see
that a new reservation and education programs are in their best interest. Here is
the only insurance policy the Catawbas can invest in for the future. One wonders
what sort of a settlement the next generation of Catawba children will need. ...
They should be able to see the results in a new reservation and in educational
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not be extinguished with a piece of paper. The Catawbas continued to need
their culture to make them whole, just as they always had, as they faced the
cha]lenges of modem life.

Pursuant to the Division of Assets Act, the tribal constitution was
revoked.'" However, the tribal government, consisting of the tribal council,
ihe executive committee, and Chief Gilbert Blue, remained intact."" The

Catawbas continued to band together on their 630 acres."' Encouraged by
successful settlements of other Indian tribes, the Catawba tribal leaders sought
the assistance of the Native Americans Rights Fund"' in 1975. The Tribe,

advantages which will benefit their tribe.... Since the Catawba tribe exists as a
viable unit, it must be protected by a wise federal government and not left without
resources.
Id. at 468-69; see also HUDSON, supra note 10, at 100.
109. 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1988).
110. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 120.
111. The Catawbas continued to function as a cohesive unit.
In 1975, the Tribe incorporated under the laws of South Carolina as a non-profit
corporation in order that it might participate in some of the federal categorical
assistance programs which were becoming available for Indian tribes through
various federal agencies other than the Department of the Interior.... Since 1975,
the Tribe has administered a number of programs for the social and economic
benefit of its members with assistance from both the State of South Carolina and
the federal government. For the past several years, the Tribe has administered a
program under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [CETA]. The
Tribe conducts adult education classes and provides job placement services for
tribal members needing employment. The Catawba reservation has been
designated by the Economic Development Administration as an 'economic
development area' and has recently opened a new tribal community center on the
reservation which houses tribal offices, meeting rooms, kitchen facilities and a
gym and shower complex. In addition to the CETA program, the Tribe has
recently been approved to administer a program for elderly tribal members which
will provide meals and other assistance, as well as a program which will provide
meals for under-privileged children on and near the reservation.
In addition, the Tribe has for several years assisted in the development of the
Catawba Pottery Association. The Association has approximately 20 members who
make pottery in the traditional Catawba method, a method which has remained
virtually unchanged since before the coming of the Europeans. The clay pits
which our Tribe has used since before colonial times are located right across the
Catawba River from the reservation. The Catawba Pottery Association assists
tribal members in finding markets for their products and has received assistance
form both the United States Department of the Interior and the State of South
Carolina.
Hearingon H.R. 3274, supra note 2, at 109-11 (statement of Chief Blue).
112. See Masthead, NARF LEGAL REV. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder Colo.),
Winter/Spring 1993, at 16 (vol. 18., no. I). It states the following:
The Native American Rights Fund is a nonprofit organization specializing in the
protection of Indian rights. The priorities of NARF are (I) the preservation of
tribal existence; (2) the protection of tribal natural resources; (3) the promotion of
human rights; (4) the accountability of governments to Native Americans; and (5)
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with NARF's support, again turned to the federal government, which had so

often disappointed them, to resolve the Tribe's land claim against South
Carolina."'
done."4

Legislation was drafted; yet in the end, again, nothing was

Litigation
After the government refused to give the Catawbas relief, the Tribe was
forced to seek redress in the courts. None of the injustice which the Catawbas
had previously faced was as grave as that which lay before them. In the past,
the Catawbas had dealt with individuals fighting over land which had
understandably brought their own personal agendas to the struggle. Now, the
Catawbas were to be cheated by a body which was supposed to be impartial,
whose sole purpose was to interpret the law.
As a prelude to understanding the litigation, the Non-Intercourse Act, the

scope of termination acts, and canons which apply to Indian law must be
emphasized. These factors will combine to determine the fate of the Catawba
people. As previously noted, the Non-Intercourse Act essentially provides that
if the federal government does not consent to the acquisition of Indian lands,
then the transaction is void."'
Furthermore, termination legislation does not terminate the existence of the
affected tribes, but rather only alters the federal government's relationship with
those tribes." '6 Clear and specific congressional action must exist to
terminate tribal powers."' A tribe can be recognized by the United States

for some purposes and not for others."'
Finally, the Supreme Court has enunciated canons of construction to be
used in construing statutes that affect Indian tribes." 9 Most importantly,

the development of Indian law.
Id.
113. This claim was based on the 1840 Treaty in which the Catawbas surrendered 144,000
acres in return for 630 acres and a small monetary payment. See supra note 59-60 and
accompanying text.
114. Miller, supra note 4, at 8-10.
115. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
116. Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1297 (4th Cir. 1983) (Catawba I),
ajfd. 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba 11), rev'd and remanded, 476 U.S. 498 (1986)
(Catawba 11); see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1000-01.
affd, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
117. Charles Verhoeven, South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe: Terminating Federal
Protection with 'Plain' Statements, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1117, 1123-24 (1987).
118. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), the Court held
that although the Menominee Tribe was no longer federally recognized, the Indian's hunting and
fishing rights, conferred through prior treaty, would continue to be protected by the federal
government. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1299-1300; see also Ulmer, supra note 32, at 129.
119, Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1296. The Court rigidly applies canons of construction that are
unique to Indian affairs. Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1124-25.
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congressional intent must be clearly expressed to abrogate or modify a treaty
right, statute or a congressionally ratified agreement, and doubtful expression
(ambiguities) should be resolved in favor of the Indians.' Furthermore, the
reserved rights doctrine requires that treaties between Indians and the United
States be interpreted not as grants to the Indians, but rather as grants from
them.' Therefore, if a treaty or agreement does not address a right, that
right is understood to be retained by the Indians.'

'Within this framework of Indian law, the Catawbas began their next
disappointing journey. In 1980, the Catawba Tribe filed suit in district court
seeking possession of its 1760 Treaty reservation that granted the Catawbas
the fifteen-mile tract of land in dispute.' The complaint named seventy-six

defendants, including the State of South Carolina and corporate and individual
landowners who represented the defendant class of landowners that laid claim

to the land.'14 At the time of the initial filing, it was estimated that 30,000
people held title to the disputed land.'"

The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the trust relationship between the federal government and the
Tribe had terminated with the 1959 Division of Assets Act, so the Catawbas
were not entitled to protection under the 1790 Non-Intercourse Act. "'

Although there are many different Indian law construction rules, the substantive
principles supporting them are similar. The government's first dealings with the
Indians were through treaties and, thus, were the product of negotiation. The
.Indian tribes came to these negotiations with a culture radically different from the
government with which they were dealing. They had no written language and the
government's concept of property ownership was alien to the Indians. As the
United States grew in power, the Indians became dependent on the federal
government for protection and fair dealing. Recognizing the Indians' inferior
bargaining position, the courts began to develop canons of construction that
interpreted federal treaties and statutes liberally in favor of the Indians.
Id. (fbotnotes omitted).
120. Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1125-26; see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,
199-200 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973); Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). In interpreting a congressionally ratified agreement
between the federal government and an Indian tribe, the Supreme Court states that "[t]he
construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in
favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who arc
ward.; of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith." Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
121. Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1125.
122. See id.; Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); Menominee,
391 U.S. at 412-13; United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941).
123. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1291.
124. Miller, supra note 4, at 10.
125. Id.
126. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1295.
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Therefore, the court reasoned that South Carolina's statute of limitations
applied and barred the claim.27
The Catawbas appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's opinion." The court held that the 1959 Division of
Assets Act did not affect the claim based on the land given to the Catawbas
through the 1760 Treaty (ratified by the 1763 Treaty and adopted by the
states) and taken away from them in the 1840 Treaty." Also, the
termination agreement did not end the trust relationship between the Tribe and
the federal government arising out of the Non-Intercourse Act.m Therefore,
South Carolina's statute of limitations did not apply to the claim because the
Non-Intercourse Act controlled.'
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Non-Intercourse Act creates a
fiduciary relationship between the federal government and tribes similar to the
relationship of guardian and ward.' This trust relationship exists even
though federal officials charged with supervision of Indian Affairs disclaim
any responsibility for the Tribe. This relationship also exists in the absence
of a federally recognized tribal government.'
In other words, as a
beginning presumption, the Non-Intercourse Act applied to the Catawbas.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 1291.
129. Id. at 1300.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1298-99. To establish a prima facie case for a violation of the Non-Intercourse
Act, the tribe must prove four elements: (1) that it is or represents an Indian tribe within the
meaning of the Non-Intercourse Act; (2) that the land in issue is covered by the Non-Intercourse
Act as tribal land; (3) that the United States has never approved or consented to the alienation
of the tribal land; and (4) that the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe,
established by coverage of the Non-Intercourse Act, has never been terminated or abandoned.
Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 (Ist Cir. 1979).
The Court in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), outlined the
policy governing lands occupied by Indians:
It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that although fee title to the
lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign - first the discovering European nation and later the original States and
the United States - a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. That right, sometimes called Indian title and good against all but the
sovereign, could be terminated only by sovereign act. Once the United States was
organized and the Constitution adopted, these tribal rights to Indian lands became
the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, recognized to be only a
right of occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United States. The Federal
Government took early steps to deal with the Indians through treaty, the principal
purpose often being to recognize and guarantee the rights of Indians to specified
areas of land.
Id. at 667-68.
133. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1298-99.
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The issue thus became whether the 1959 Division of Assets Act effectively
terminated the relationship protected under the Non-Intercourse Act. The court
recognized that Congress may terminate the trust relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes arising out of the Non-Intercourse Act
through a plain and unambiguous intention to do so." 4 The court also
recognized the canon of construction that any doubtful expression of
legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the Indians."'
Since the Division of Assets Act was ambiguous as to the extent of
termination, the court found it necessary to examine the Act's legislative
history. The court recognized that during negotiations for the termination
agreement, the Tribe expressed its desire, acknowledged by the government,
that any land claim arising out of the 1840 Treaty would remain
unaffected."3 The legislative history of the 1959 Division of Assets Act
showed that the termination agreement was only intended to end the federal
supervision and assistance which arose under the 1943 Memorandum of
Understanding.'37 Of course, under the canon of construction which
construes ambiguities in favor of the Indians, all that would have been needed
to reach this conclusion was a showing that the legislative history was unclear
on the subject.
The Fourth Circuit further found that the Catawbas remained "Indians" for
the purposes of the Non-Intercourse Act subsequent to the 1959 Division of
Assets Agreement. The Supreme Court had defined a "tribe" as "a body of
Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one
leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes illdefined territory."'' The Court has applied this definition to bring within the
scope of the Non-Intercourse Act a tribe of Indians that did not have a
federally recognized form of government.'39 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the Catawbas, despite revocation of the tribal constitution, had
continued as a body of Indians, united in a community under one leadership,
and inhabiting a defined territory.)
Moreover, South Carolina itself had continued to recognize the Catawbas
as a tribe by continuing to hold the 630-acre reservation in trust. 4'
Furthermore, the Division of Assets Act provided for the continuance of some
Indian projects.
"Clearly, the Congress did not intend the Division of

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1299; 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1982).
Catawba , 718 F.2d at 1298.
'Id.
Id. See also supra note 104.
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Assets Act of 1959 to end the Tribe's existence." 43 As a final point of
support, the court noted that in at least one other termination act, Congress
clearly terminated the federal trust relationship with respect to the affected
tribe, something it did not do in the Catawbas' Division of Assets Act.'"
The Fourth Circuit concluded by holding that the district court erred in
finding South Carolina's statutes of limitations applicable to the claim because
the Non-Intercourse Act and the supremacy clause preempt state law defenses
such as the statutes of limitations. 4S Furthermore, the 1959 Division of
Assets Act did not affect the Catawbas' claim. The 1959 Act "neither
confirms the claim nor extinguishes it."'" One year later, the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed its decision.' 47
The defendants appealed the Fourth Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding in direct
opposition to the Fourth Circuit, that the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the 1959 Division of Assets Act was to end all the Catawbas' federal
protections, including that derived from the Non-Intercourse Act.'"
The Court based its decision on the determination that there could be no
alternative interpretation to section 935 of the Catawba Division of Assets
Act, which provides:
[T]he tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the
special services performed by the United States for Indians
because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the United States
that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall apply to
them in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens
within their jurisdiction. Nothing in this subchapter, however,
shall affect
the status of such persons as citizens of the United
49
States.

The center of debate, and in fact the fate of the Catawba people, came to rest
on the interpretation of these words. The question was whether the words
"them" and "their" found in the second clause of the first sentence refer to the
tribe and its members or the individual members only. This distinction is
critical because federal protection is lifted and state law applied only to the
subject of the second clause of the sentence (and not to the subject of the first
clause). The Court found it was unmistakably clear that the words "them" and
"their" in the second clause of the sentence meant both the tribe and the

143. Catawba 1, 718 F.2d at 1298.
144. Id. at 1300. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1988) (Catawba Tribe, no explicit termination)
with 25 U.S.C. § 980 (1988) (Ponca Tribe, explicit termination).
145. Catawba , 718 F.2d at 1300.
146. Id. at 1301.
147. Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (Catawba 11).
148. South Carolina v. Catawba Indians, 476 U.S. 498, 507 (1986) (Catawba III).
149. 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1988).
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individual members, because "tribe and members" was used in the first clause
of the sentence.'O
Since the Court determined that the wording was crystal clear, the court
reasoned that the legislative history of the 1959 Division of Assets Act, which
showed that both Congress and the Catawbas intended to preserve the
Catawbas' claim, did not need to be examined.
However, a closer
examination of the wording shows, as the Fourth Circuit determined, that
section 935 of the Division of Assets Act is not at all as "clear and
unambiguous" as the Supreme Court found it to be. The Supreme Court
reasoned "that the antecedent of the words 'them' and 'their'. . . is the
compound subject of the first clause in the sentence, namely, 'the tribe and its
members.""5' Thus, all clauses in the sentence refer to the tribe. However,
the very fact that a question of interpretation exists is potent evidence of the
Division of Assets Act's ambiguity.'
A stronger argument exists that the second clause only refers to individual
tribal members."s If "them" and "their" meant the tribe and its members
then the Court would effectively be adding the words "or tribes" to "Indians"
in the second clause.' 5 Further, the words, "such persons" contained in the
second sentence refers to something in the preceding sentence. Most logically,
"such persons" refers to the "them" in the last clause of the preceding
sentence. Therefore, the words "such persons" only refers to individual
Indians and not the tribe." However, whichever interpretation is correct,
this obvious ambiguity should have lifted the ban on the use of extrinsic
evidence."
Still, the Supreme Court found that no ambiguity existed and therefore the
canon of construction granting any ambiguity in favor of the Indians did not
apply. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that all federal protection had been
terminated in 1959.' Therefore, the state's statute of limitations should
apply."9 The Catawbas were effectively denied their lands through a game
of words.'" Prior to this ruling, the court had refused to apply a state law

150. Catawba III, 476 U.S. at 506-07; see aLso Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1128-30.
151. Id.; see also Catawba 11I,
476 U.S. at 506-07.
152. Id. at 506.
153. Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1130.
154. Id. at 1129-30.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. South Carolina v. Catawba Indians, 476 U.S. 498, 504 (1986) (Catmvba 111).
Actual
termination occurred in 1962 when Termination Act took effect.
159. Id. at 507.
160. Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent:
When an Indian Tribe has been assimilated and dispersed to this extent - and
when, as the majority points out, thousands of people now claim interests in the
Tribe's ancestral homeland.... the Tribe's claim to that land may seem ethereal,
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time bar to a Non-Intercourse claim. 6' Although, the Court declined to
consider whether the statute of limitations did in fact apply and remanded the

case back to the Fourth Circuit to do so.
Luckily for the Catawbas, the Fourth Circuit once again reached a decision

that kept their claim alive. The first consideration in the case was whether the
Catawbas could satisfy section 15-3-340 of the South Carolina Code, which
provides that "[n]o action for the recovery of real property . ..shall be
maintained unless it appear[s] that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or

grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years
before the commencement of such action.""l62 Section 15-67-210 creates a
presumption of possession if the plaintiff establishes legal title. Even though
the Tribe had not been in possession of the disputed land since 1840, the
63
Catawbas still had legal title which satisfied the statutes.
The court then determined that only those landowners who could establish
a ten-year continuous possession of their land between 1962, the effective date
of the Division of Assets Act, and October 1980, the date the suit was filed,
could successfully defend the Catawbas' claim." South Carolina, in contrast

and the manner of the Tribe's dispossession may seem of no more than historical
interest. But the demands of justice do not cease simply because a wronged people
grow less distinctive, or because the rights of innocent third parties must be taken
into account in fashioning a remedy. Today's decision seriously handicaps the
Catawbas' effort to obtain even partial redress for the illegal expropriation of lands
twice pledged to them, and it does so by attributing to Congress, in effect, an
unarticulated intent to trick the Indians a century after the property changed hands.
From any perspective, there is little to be proud of here.
Because I do not believe that Congress in 1959 expressed an unambiguous
desire to encumber the Catawbas' claim to their 18th century treaty lands, and
because I agree with Justice Black that '[gireat nations, like great men, should
keep their word,' ...I do not join the judgment of the court.
dissenting) (citations omitted).
Catawba III,476 U.S. at 527 (Blackmun, J.,
161. Verhoeven, supra note 117, at 1122.
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-340 (Law. Co-op. 1976), quoted in Catawba Indians v. South
Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1452 (4th Cir. 1989) (Catawba IV).
163. Catawba IV, 865 F.2d at 1448. The court reasoned:
Indian title is a creation of federal law. It is the title given to land occupied by
Indians when the United States gained its independence from Great Britain and
became the sovereign. Indian tite includes a right to possession superior to that
incident to fee simple title; where Indian title and fee simple title coexist, the fee
simple interest operates merely as a reversionary right to possession which can
take effect only when Congress extinguishes the Indian title. Indian title includes
the right to exclude all others, including holders of fee simple title, through state
law possessory actions such as ejectment and trespass. Indian title cannot be
alienated except by Act of Congress; a purported conveyance of the possessory
right, even if made by a tribe having such title, is void and no tite passes. Except
where Congress provides otherwise, claims based on Indian title are not subject
to state law defenses such as statutes of limitations, adverse possession, or laches.
ld.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
164. Catawba IV, 865 F.2d at 1445.
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to the overwhelming majority of states, does not allow "tacking" for adverse
possession.'" Therefore, the difficulty for the landowners laid in establishing
their ten-year continuous possession. Quite possibly, those landowners that
could not would lose their property.
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine
which claims were barred. The district court dismissed the overwhelming
majority of the claims.'" The biggest problem, however, came from the
district judge's refusal to certify the total class of defendants who owned land
in the fifteen-mile tract involved in the claim.'" This refusal meant that if
the Catawbas wanted to sue the approximately 62,000 individual owners, they
would have to serve each defendant individually, and they would have to do
so before October 1992.1'
In the hopes that a settlement could be reached, the federal legislature
stepped in and passed a bill which granted a one-year time extension on the
statute of limitations.'" At the same time, the Catawbas brought suit against
the United States government for the breach of its promise to protect the

Catawbas' land from the 1959 Termination Act.'" Again, the Catawbas were
told the statute of limitations barred the claim, which should have been
brought by 1968 at the latest.'

165. At least for the purposes of the statute in question. South Carolina does have a 20-yar
statute of limitations statute which allows tacking, but since the Catawbas filed their suit in 1980,
18 years after the Division of Assets Act became effective in 1962, the statute which allowed
tacking did not apply. Catawba Indians v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1342 (4th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1415 (1993) (Catawba V); see also Catawba IV, 865 F.2d at 1452 n.7.
166. Miller, supra note 4, at 11. Twenty-nine landowners dismissed along with thousands
of acres. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed some of the claims and upheld others. Catawba
V, 978 F.2d at 1349.
167. In re Catawba Indian Tribe, 973 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1992).
168. Exactly 61,767 potential defendants existed. The district court's denial of class
certification had the effect of starting the limitations "clock" which had stopped ticking in 1980
when the initial suit had been filed (18 years after termination). The denial meant that in twenty
months, twenty years would have elapsed since the initial filing. Therefore, the defendants would
have been able to use tacking to show adverse possession under a separate South Carolina statute
which required a twenty year showing of adverse possession but which allowed tacking of
adverse possession periods (as opposed to the 10 year statute used in prior court analysis which
did not allow tacking). Telephone Interview with Don Miller, Attorney, Native American Rights
Fund (NARF) (Oct. 27, 1993). Miller is the NARF attorney who has represented the Catawbas
over the last 18 years, since the inception of formalized negotiations.
169. Act of Aug. 11, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-339, 106 Stat. 869.
170. Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 24 (1991), affld, 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2995 (1993).
171. Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied,
113 S. Ct. 2995 (1993). The court determined that some of the claims were barred by Indian
Claims Commission Act. "The Commission shall receive claims for a period of five years after
August 13, 1946, and no claim existing before that date but not presented within such period may
then'after be submitted to any court or administrative agency for consideration, nor will such
claim thereafter be entertained by Congress." 25 U.S.C. § 70k (1988). The remaining claims were

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/7

No. 1]

COMMENT

In the meantime, the Catawbas had continued in their preparations for suits

against the individual landowners. The Tribe remained hopeful a settlement
would be reached, but negotiations stalled in 1991." The Catawbas wanted
more self-government and more money than the government offered." a In
April 1992, NARF attorneys began their final preparations for suing and

serving process on the 61,767 occupants of the disputed land. NARF had
prepared for each party a stack of documents totaling over sixteen inches

thick, including the pleadings, a service of process form, and a seal." This

extensive preparation renewed the interest in settling the dispute.'5 Finally,
the negotiators came up with an agreement that was accepted by the Catawbas
by a vote of 289-42.76 On October 27, 1993, President Clinton signed the

bill into law.'"
The Settlement
The total value of the settlement is estimated to be between $80 and $90
million. 7' A total of $50 million in cash will be received over a five-year

period; the federal government will contribute $32 million and the State of
South Carolina and private sources will contribute $18 million."

The

barred by the Tucker Act. "Every claim of which the United States Claims Court has jurisdiction
shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues."
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988).
172. Miller, supra note 4, at 12.
173. Id.
174. Id. NARF had previously hired several large marketing firms to research the Tax
Assessor's records. Through these records, all the current property owners were located.
175. Telephone Interview with Don Miller, supra note 168.
Even though the state had a sympathetic judiciary, they couldn't prevent us from
bringing our claims. The ball was on our side because we had a valid possessory
right. Basically, the suit would have crippled the court system. We would have
been enjoined from the actual service of process if we had filed the claims in court
because the court was not at that time able to handle such a tremendous caseload
and the law offices in town could not handle the number of claims, totaling
61,767.
Id. Also, the landowners of the area had for years been subjected to title problems because of.the
claim. Included among the affected was Heritage Park, home of Jim Bakker. A cloud on title
insurance prevented several potential purchasers from negotiating to purchase Heritage Park.
JoAnn Skoog, National Notebook: Rock Hill, S.C.; Capitalizing on Land Values, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1989, § 8,at 1;Steve Emmons, Baker's Heritage USA Is Born Again, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1991, § (View), at 1.
176. Telephone Interview with Don Miller, supra note 168.
177. Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 103116, 107 Stat. 1118 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 941 (Supp. V 1993)). See supra note I and
accompanying text.
178. Settlement, supra note 5, at 1. See appendix for summary of agreement.
179. Settlement, supra note 5, at 1.In addition to payments. from the federal and state
governments, the settlement provides for $1.4 million to be paid from title insurance companies,
$500,000 from Duke Power Company, $500,000 from Crescent Resources, $2 million from York
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remainder of the settlement will come from in-kind contributions from federal
and state agencies."m The 1959 Division of Assets Act is repealed and the
Catawbas are once again a federally recognized tribe."' In exchange, the
Catawba Tribe has relinquished its land claim arising out of the 1840 Treaty
of Nation Ford, the 1760 and 1763 Treaties, and any land claim based on
aboriginal title."
Under the settlement, the money the Catawbas receive will be placed into
five different trust funds for: (1) land acquisition, (2) economic development,
(3) social services and elderly assistance, (4) education, and (5) per-capita
payments. " All of these funds will be managed on a permanent basis
except for the per-capita payment trust fund. A minimum of $7.5 million will
be placed into the per-capita payment trust for disbursement to individual
tribal members.'" Tribal membership will be determined by the Tribe's own
requirements - descendance from a person listed on the 1961 federal roll."'
The settlement allows the Catawbas to purchase up to three thousand acres
of additional reservation lands. The new lands will be sought within planning
zones, close to the existing reservation. The substantial portion of these land
purchases must be made within a ten-year period."
Powers not set out for the Tribe in the settlement act reside with the State
of South Carolina. The Catawba Tribe has jurisdiction over internal tribal
matters but the State retains control over all criminal activity on the
reservation. Although, the Tribe has the option of developing a tribal court
with concurrent criminal jurisdiction over tribal members to the same
jurisdiction exercised by a state magistrate court over misdemeanors and petty
defenses. The Tribe may also elect to establish a civil court to hear matters
arising in the reservation with concurrent jurisdiction with the State.", South
Caxolina exercises environmental regulatory jurisdiction over Catawba lands,
and state health codes also apply. The Catawbas are also subject to state
regulation in the areas of hunting, fishing; and water control and must adopt
local building codes."t
Members of the Tribe will pay taxes on income earned on the reservation
to both the federal and state governmehits. Most Indians do not have to make

County, $250,000 from Lancaster County and other contributions from banks and individuals.

The payments are to be made over a five- or six-year period. Riddle, supra note I, § 8, at 1.
180. Settlement, supra note 5, at 1.

181. See appendix for summary of agreement
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Settlement, supra note 5, at 1.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
See appendix for summary of agreement.
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such payments to the state. Members' personal property is also subject to state
tax. However, real property and the per-capita payments are exempt."
The settlement provides the Catawbas only a limited opportunity to profit
from games of chance. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not apply on
the reservation. The Tribe can operate bingo and video machines which are
subject to state law. Although, the bingo stakes can be higher than otherwise
permitted in the state and more games can be played per day."9
Chief Gilbert Blue expressed his approval of the settlement: "I feel like
we're on the edge of a new day for the Catawba people. Nothing will replace
the loss of our lands but this settlement is a tool that will allow us to create
a better way of life for our children..' 9 Of course, the settlement did not
come without its critics. Those opposed to the agreement claim that the
Catawbas are relinquishing too much of their sovereignty for cash.'" The
settlement did confer upon the Catawbas fewer rights than many other Indian
tribes enjoy."' As previously outlined, the Catawbas have very limited
jurisdiction over crimes and civil disputes arising on their lands under the
settlement."9 Also, the Catawbas have to pay state' income taxes in addition
to federal taxes."' The Tribe has also agreed to defer to state regulation in
the areas of hunting, fishing, and water rights." And, as stated previously,
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not apply on the Catawba
reservation.'"
On the issue of tribal sovereignty, Cherokee Chief Wilma Mankiller stated,
"I believe that the rights of tribes... are inherent, and that when we talk
about our rights as tribal people, we should be talking about the rights we
have had since time immemorial."'9 Critics charge the Catawbas have
bargained away those rights. However, as a practical matter, the settlement
confers rights upon the Catawbas the government did not previously extend

189. See appendix for summary of agreement.
190. The Tribe can offer bingo stakes of up to $100,000 per game and can play an unlimited

number of games, six days a week. See appendix for summary of agreement.
191. Settlement, supranote 5, at I.
192. See Tribe Votes to End Land Claimfor $50 Million, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at 14.
193. Id.; Telephone interview with Don Miller, supra note 168.

194. See appendix for summary of agreement. "Most tribes are recognized by Congress as
self-governing nations that operate within federal guidelines and are not controlled by state laws."
Tribe Votes To End Land Claim for $50 Million, supra note 192, at 14. In the case of the
Catawbas, extensive state supervision exists. Id.
195. See appendix for summary of agreement.
196. See appendix for summary of agreement.
197. See appendix for summary of agreement. However, the Catawbas don't want to operate
gambling facilities because the Tribe is predominantly of the Mormon faith and the members do
not believe in gambling. Lyn Riddle, Tribe Gambles It Can Turn Profit Without Bingo, L.A.
TIMEs, May 19, 1993, at 5.
198. Settlement, supra note 5, at 1.
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Before the agreement, the Catawbas were not a federally

recognized tribe and possessed little. Now, the Catawbas are a federally

recognized tribe with powers of self-government and possess sufficient funds
to effectively improve the Tribe and its individual members' lives.2'

The

government-to-government relationship exists once again.
A Report Card

Don Miller, NARF attorney who has represented the Catawbas since the
inception of the land claim eighteen years ago, concluded:
Basically, the courts that decided our case get an F. They didn't
care what the law said. They were result-oriented and intent upon

dismissing this case. It was an embarrassment to the judicial
system. I would have liked to receive more, but we were lucky
to salvage what we did."'
Conclusion

Since the Europeans first visited Catawba country, the bands of Indians
which became known as the Catawbas continuously offered their support and
loyalty to their white neighbors. In 1760, the Catawbas gave up sixty miles

of land in return for clear title to a fifteen mile tract. Still, white settlers
encroached on their lands. In 1840, the Catawbas gave up their fifteen miles

of land in return for 630 acres and minimal compensation.
However, the 1840 transaction was not approved of by the federal

government as was required under the Non-Intercourse Act. Furthermore,
South Carolina failed to abide by the terms of the agreement. Because the

1840 agreement was void, the Catawbas claimed entitlement to the return of
the fifteen-mile tract of land.

199. Telephone Interview with Don Miller, supra note 168.
200. "Basically, the Settlement is Public Law 280 plus." Telephone Interview with Don
Miller, supra note 168. For a discussion of Public Law 280 see COHEN, supra note 44, at 363.
Currently, 65 families make up the Tribe. Mike Toner, Most of the World's Languages Saying
Goodbye Forever;TV Tongue-Ties Global Village, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 17. 1991, at Al.
In total, the Catawbas have 1300 members. Christina Connor, It'll Get Better, Catawba River
IndiansSay, L.A. TiMes, Dec. 5, 1993, at Al. Perhaps the saddest right lost for the Catawbas
through the legislation has been access to the clay-pits which Catawbas have used for centuries
to produce their pottery. "King's Bottom" lies across the Catawba River from the reservation and
until recently the owners of the land had allowed the Catawbas access to the pits. After being
named as a defendant in the Catawbas' lawsuit, the owner of the clay-pits revoked the permission
and now that the Catawbas' claim to the clay lands has been relinquished through settlement, the
only hope the Catawbas have of regaining access to the pits is through the voluntary sale to the
Catawbas of the land. IndiansGain Land, But Lose Pottery Clay, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992,
at A2.
201. Telephone Interview with Don Miller, supra note 168.
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In 1943, the federal government recognized the Catawbas' deteriorating
condition. The federal government and South Carolina then entered into an
agreement with the Catawbas for the federal government to provide limited
services to the Catawbas and for South Carolina to purchase additional lands
to be held in trust for the Tribe. South Carolina attempted to condition the
agreement on the Catawbas' release of all land claims arising out the 1760 and
1840 agreements, but neither the federal government nor the Catawbas
allowed the claim's release to be part of the agreement. Pursuant to the 1943
agreement, South Carolina did purchase 3434 acres of land for the Catawbas
and conveyed title to that land to the federal government.
In 1959, the federal government decided to terminate the relationship it had
created with the Catawbas in 1943. The tribal constitution was revoked and
the 3434 acres purchased through the 1943 agreement was sold and the
proceeds distributed to individual tribal members. However, the Catawbas'
630-acre tract remained unaffected. South Carolina continues to hold title to
that land in trust for the Tribe.
Between 1975 and 1979, the Catawbas tried repeatedly to obtain the
legislature's assistance in settling their claim, but in the end, nothing was
done. The Catawbas were forced to take their struggle to the courts. In 1980,
the first Catawba suit was filed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that
the 1959 termination agreement had ended the trust responsibility between the
federal government and the Catawbas based on the "unmistakably clear"
meaning of an unclear sentence. The Fourth Circuit then determined that
South Carolina's statute of limitations would allow the Catawbas to bring a
claim, but only against those landowners who could not show a ten-year
continuous possession between 1962, when the termination act took effect,
and 1980, when suit was filed.
It then became clear that the only way the Catawbas could recover
anything was to individually sue each landowner that currently held
possession of the land in dispute. On practically the eve of the scheduled
filing date, a settlement was reached. Many benefits will result to the Tribe
and its people as a result. However, in reflection, the Catawbas' plight cannot
be called a victory.
The Catawbas struggled for over two hundred years to have their land
returned to them. Of the five treaties the Tribe entered into with the
government, the only one which the government upheld was the termination
agreement. The courts enforced the termination agreement beyond the scope
of the act's own terms. In the end, the Catawbas lost their claim to land worth
over $2 billion and were left with less than one-half of one percent of their
former lands. The reward was limited sovereign powers and $50 million inadequate compensation for such a tremendous loss, yet perhaps the best the
Catawbas could hope for.
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APPENDIX
"Summary of the Agreement in Principle to Settle the Land Claim of the
Catawba Tribe of South Carolina," NARF Legal Rev. (Native American
Rig:hts Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Winter/Spring 1993, at 3 (vol. 18, no. I).
Reprinted with permission.
Restoration
The trust relationship between the Tribe and the United States will be
restored, the Tribe will become a federally-recognized Indian Tribe and it and
its members will be eligible for Federal Indian services, including education,
health, social services, and housing. The 1959 Termination Act will be
repealed.
Tribal Trust Funds
Over a five-year period, the Federal Government and State of South
Carolina will contribute $50 million to be placed into five trust funds: a Land
Acquisition Trust, an Economic Development Trust, a Social Services and
Elderly Assistance Trust,.an Education Trust, and a per Capita Payment Trust.
The Secretary of the Interior will manage and invest the trust funds unless the
Tribe chooses to use private sector investment managers with proven
competence and experience. Generally, the Tribe will determine how much
money will be placed in each trust fund, except that the Agreement requires
$7.5 million to go to the per capita payment fund and $6 million to go to the
Education Trust. Except for the per capita payment fund, the trust funds are
set up to be permanent funds. With some limitations, the Tribe may transfer
money among trust funds and the Secretary or private investment manager is
required to provide the Tribe an accounting at least annually.
Expanded Reservation
The existing reservation may be expanded to 3000 acres, plus an additional
604) acres of undeveloped land (flood plains or wetlands, for example).
Another 600 acres could be added to the reservation with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, county councils and the State Legislature, bringing
the maximum reservation size to 4200 acres.
The additional land must be purchased from willing sellers with two
defined areas close to the existing reservation, and will be bought by the Tribe
from money in the Land Acquisition Trust. The Secretary of the Interior and
a professional land planning firm will assist the Tribe in developing a
reservation development and land acquisition plan. The Tribe is required to
make every effort to buy land that borders the existing reservation, but if that
is not possible, the Tribe may buy lands in up to three non-contiguous tracts
if they are reasonably close to the existing reservation, within the two defined
zones, and the county councils and the Governor approve the Tribe's plan for
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such a configuration. If land cannot be purchased within the two defined
zones, the Tribe may buy reservation land in an undefined third zone to be
proposed by the Tribe if the Secretary and the State and local governments
approve.
The Tribe will coordinate its planning activities with the City of Rock Hill,
York and Lancaster Counties, and the State of South Carolina to ensure that
the expanded reservation has access to roads and sewage treatment. Major
land purchases for the reservation must be completed within 10 years of the
final settlement payment: some minor purchases to round out or connect noncontiguous reservation tracts may be made for 20 years after the final
settlement payment. The Tribe may buy and sell non-reservation land without
restriction. Such land would have the same tax and legal status as any other
land in the State, but would be eligible for federal grants and other Indian
services and benefits.
Tribal Government, Jurisdictionand Governance
The Tribe may organize its government under the Indian Reorganization
Act if it chooses and the Indian Civil Rights Act will apply. The
governmental powers of the Tribe are those that are expressly set out in the
Agreement in Principle, and powers not set out for the Tribe reside in the
State. The Tribe will have jurisdiction over internal tribal matters, including
the powers: 1) to zone and regulate the use and disposition of tribalproperty;
2) to define laws, petty crimes and rules of conduct applicable to members of
the Tribe while on the reservation, supplementing but not supplanting criminal
laws of the State of South Carolina; 3) to regulate the conduct of businesses
located on the reservation; 4) to levy taxes; 5) to grant exemptions or waivers
from any tribal laws, tribal regulations, or tribal taxes, except the Tribal Sales
and Use Taxes, otherwise applicable on the reservation, including waivers of
the jurisdiction of any tribal court; 6) to adopt its own form of government;
7) to determine its own membership; 8) to charter tribally-owned economic
development corporations and enterprises; and 9) to exclude non-members
from its membership rolls and from the reservation, except on public roads,
the Catawba River, and public or private easements. The Tribe will possess
the same immunity from suit as cities and counties possess in South Carolina
and will be required to carry the same level of liability insurance as cities and
counties are required to carry.
The State will continue to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians and
non-Indians on the Tribe's reservation. If the Tribe desires, it may provide in
its Constitution for a tribal court with concurrent criminal jurisdiction over
tribal members only that is limited to the same jurisdiction exercised by a
state magistrate's court over misdemeanors and petty offenses that would be
specified in ordinances adopted by the Tribe. The Tribe has the option of
employing tribal police officers if they receive the same training as Sheriffs
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deputies and are cross-deputized by the York and Lancaster County Sheriffs
Departments.
The Tribe may also elect to establish a civil court. The tribal court's civil
jurisdiction would be limited to matters arising on the reservation and would
be concurrent with the civil jurisdiction of the State in most circumstances.
With some limitations, the tribal court would have jurisdiction over cases
involving the Tribe or its members in the following areas: 1) contracts made
or to be performed on the reservation; 2) cases involving injury caused by
negligence (non-Indians could have their cases removed to State court); 3)
internal matters of the Tribe; 4) domestic relations where both spouses to the
marriage are tribal members; 5) enforcement of tribal laws regulating conduct
on the reservation; and 6) cases arising under the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Most tribal court cases would be appealable to state court and the Tribe would
have the ability to waive the authority of the tribal court.
The State will have environmental regulatory jurisdiction and state health
codes will apply on the new reservation. The Tribe agrees to adopt local
building codes and hunting, fishing, and water rights will be subject to state
regulation.
Taxation
The Tribe, the tribal trust funds, and tribally owned enterprises will be nontaxable for federal income tax purposes like other federal tribes, an its income
will be non-taxable by the State for 99 years. Federal trust lands will be
exempt from real property taxes, and improvements on the land will be
exempt from real property taxes for 99 years. The Tribe will make substitute
payments to support its children in the public schools. The State will not tax
any sales occurring on the reservation, but the Tribe agrees to impose and
collect a sales tax equal to the State's sales tax. Purchases by the Tribe in its
governmental capacity will be exempt from State sales and will be exempt
from State sales and use taxes for 99 years. The Tribe will have the same
Federal tax treatment as other Federal tribes under the Indian Tribal
Government Tax Status Act and will be able to issue bonds to finance certain
projects.
Members of the Tribe, like members of other Federal tribes, will pay
Federal tax on income earned on the reservation. Unlike members of other
Federal tribes, they will also pay state income taxes on income earned on the
reservation, unless they work for the Tribe performing governmental
functions, in which case they will not pay state income taxes for 99 years. Per
capita payments will be exempt from state and federal income taxes. Income
from the sale of pottery and artifacts made by members of the Tribe on or off
the reservation will be exempt from sales and use taxes. Members' homes will
be exempt from property taxes for 99 years. Members' personal property,
such as cars and boats, will be subject to state tax.
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Games of Chance
The... [settlement] gives the Tribe the option of having bingo and video
machines. Generally, state law would govern any gaming on the reservation
and only those gaming activities that are permitted by State law would be
permitted on the Reservation. However, the Tribe would be permitted to
sponsor much higher stakes bingo games ($100,000) more frequently
(unlimited number of games, six days a week) than is permitted other bingo
operators in the State. The State would tax tribal bingo proceeds at a rate of
10% of gross - a tax rate slightly lower than that paid by other bingo
operators in the State. The Indian Gaming Regulation Act would not apply
on the Catawba Reservation.
Tribal Membership
The Tribe's membership will be determined by the Tribe, and the
settlement legislation will incorporate the Tribe's own membership
requirements, that is, descendance from someone listed on the 1961 Federal
roll. The minimal state services and tax exemptions for individuals and the
Tribe that will cease after 99 years will have no effect on the Tribe's
membership, its federal relationship, or it eligibility for federal services.
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